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sidered in [54] , where interactions occur at multiple levels, with members of the 23 same community interacting more commonly than those in different communities.
24
A more general framework that can be used is that of [11] where it is possible 25 to consider multiplayer interactions in groups of any size, depending upon various 26 factors like the population's history, whilst keeping the beneficial aspects of evolu-27 tionary graph theory. More recently this framework has been used to model different 28 kinds of multiplayer behaviour [13, 9, 12] . In this paper, we extend this work to 29 consider a population of mobile individuals, focusing on a specific multiplayer game, 30 a public goods game [6, 7, 25, 55] . 
41
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 the model framework is described 42 in general, with examples of each concept being given to motivate how it can be 43 applied, in Section 3 the framework is applied to create a Markov movement model, 44 in Section 4 we describe the results of the Markov movement model, and Section 5 45 is a general discussion.
46
2. The framework of [11] . This section presents the framework of [11] for mod-47 elling the evolution of a population in a which the movement of individuals follows a 48 discrete-time stochastic process. In particular we update the terminology from the 49 original paper somewhat, and the methodology described here will be applicable to 50 a wide variety of scenarios, although we focus on a Markov movement model (and 51 indeed a specific one only) in the current paper. The framework can be broken 52 down into three components that each describe a certain aspect of the population: 53 structure, fitness, and evolutionary dynamics. given time, and so we shall find it convenient to talk about distribution in place 61 of structure. In a population of N individuals who can move around M places, 62 the population distribution at time t is given in [11] by an N × M binary matrix 63 Population distribution at time t. m <t = (m t−1 , . . . , m 0 ) Population distribution history. p t (m|m <t ) ∈ [0, 1] Probability population has distribution m at time t given history m <t . π t ∈ [0, 1] Population distribution probability function (PDPF). P (m <t ) ∈ [0, 1] Probability that population has history m <t . π n,t ∈ [0, 1] Individual distribution probability function (IDPF). f n,t ≥ 0 Fitness contribution of I n at time t. F n,t > 0 Fitness of I n at time t. G n ⊂ {1, 2 . . . , N } Direct group: group that I n is in. w i,j,t ≥ 0 Replacement weight that I i replaces I j at time t. W t = [w i,j,t ] i,j=1,...,N Weighted adjacency matrix of evolutionary graph. Fixation probability of type A when initial state is S. r ij ∈ [0, 1] Probability that I i replaces I j . h n ∈ [0, 1] Probability that I n stays. α n ∈ [0, 1] Staying propensity: probability that individual I n stays when alone.
C (D)
Cooperator and defector interactive strategy.
∈ R Benefit of being with cooperator (defector). S ∈ (0, 1) Sensitivity shown to group members. v > 0 Reward as a multiple of background fitness. c ∈ [0, 1) Cost as a multiple of background fitness. R n ≥ 0 Payoff to I n . λ ∈ [0, min(R n )) Movement cost.
Cooperator (defector) with staying propensity α. γ (δ) ∈ [0, 1] Nash equilibrium staying propensity of cooperator (defector). Table 1 . Notation used in the paper. denoted X t = (X To consider the Markov movement models that are the subject of the current paper,
67
it is convenient to use an alternative matrix representation of the population dis-68 tribution. Here the population distribution at time t will be denoted by the matrix 69 M t = [M n,t ] n=1,...,N , where M n,t = m if individual I n is in place P m at time t.
70
The framework assumes that the movement of individuals is probabilistic such 71 that there is dependence upon time and the current and past movements of in-72 dividuals in the population. In particular, the transition probability function de-73 noted p t (m|m <t ) gives the probability that the movement of individuals at time 
77 78
whose exact form will depend upon the model being used but will always satisfy
80
81
The population distribution probability function (PDPF) π t (m) gives the prob-
82
ability that the population distribution is m after t time steps regardless of the 83 population distribution history. It can be expressed using the transition probabili-84 ties as where P (m <t ) denotes the historical PDPF that gives the probability that the 88 population distribution history is m <t and is written as
91 92
where the probability of the initial population distribution, π 0 (m 0 ), is assumed to 93 be known. where π n,t (m n ) denotes the individual distribution probability function (IDPF) that
99
gives the probability of individual I n being present in place P mn at time t indepen-100 dently of the history of the process. The expression for π n,t (m n ) will depend upon 101 whether the movement of I n is dependent upon the whole population distribution 102 history or just its own individual history.
103
Dependence on the population distribution history. When the movement of individ-104 ual I n depends upon the distribution history of the whole population, the individual 105 transition probability function p n,t (m n |m <t ) gives the probability that I n moves to 106 place m n at time t given the population history m <t and is given as follows
108 109
The individual transition probability function is then defined as follows probability function is given as follows 116 p t (m n |m n,<t ) = P(M n,t = m n |M n,t−1 = m n,t−1 , . . . , M n,0 = m n,0 ).
118
The IDPF is then given by
120 121 where P n (m n,<t ) denotes the individual history distribution as follows function is denoted p n (m) and we have that
128 129 and therefore the PDPF can simply be written
where the exact form will depend upon the assumptions about the factors that 138 contribute to an individual's fitness. The mean fitness contribution at time t is 139 then as follows 
, is the set of individuals that are present
157
with it in the same place for population distribution m and is defined as follows
159 160
We then denote the fitness contribution as f n (G n (m)). In this case, the mean fitness 161 change is constant over time and therefore the fitness is equal to the mean fitness by an evolutionary graph defined using an N × N weighted adjacency matrix W t =
168
[w i,j,t ] i,j=1,...,N where the replacement weight w i,j,t gives the weight of the edge 169 from node i to node j in the evolutionary graph that represent individuals I i and 170 I j respectively.
171
The contribution to a replacement weight depends upon the time t, the current The exact form will depend upon the assumptions made about the replacement 178 weight contributions. The mean replacement weight contribution is given as follows but, as for the fitness function, there are other definitions that one can use.
186
The probability that the offspring of individual I i replaces individual I j , denoted 187 r ij , is defined using the replacement weights and fitnesses as in [45] . The different 188 definitions of the replacement probabilities are summarised in Table 2 .
189
For the fully independent movement model, the mean replacement weight con-
190
tribution is defined as follows probabilities are described using the dynamics as follows 
215
This probability is found by solving the following equation For type B individuals we can use the fact that ρ
222
We shall consider a population where a population is all of a single type, but
223
where a single population member is selected uniformly at random to be replaced 224 by one of the opposite type. We are thus interested in calculating the fixation 225 probability where state S consists of only one individual (all but one individual).
226
There are N initial states from which the fixation probability can be calculated,
227
and we take an arithmetic mean of these fixation probabilities, which we denote
. Alternatively, one could weight the fixation probability of a mutant This expression can be rewritten using the M × M probability matrix p n,t =
258
[p n,t (m n |m n,t−1 )] for m n , m n,t−1 = 1, . . . , M as follows homogeneity, that is p n,t = p n for all t, then this simplifies to
264 265
In this case, assuming that p n is irreducible and aperiodic for all n, then as t → ∞
266
the IDPF π n,∞ is stationary for all n. Essentially, our model is then equivalent to 267 the fully independent movement model. We do not consider this case further here,
268
but rather refer the reader to [9] for a detailed discussion of this kind of model. 
where h n (G n (m t−1 )) denotes the staying probability of individual I n and N − 1 is 288 the number of neighbouring places that an individual can move to in a complete 289 graph.
290
The staying probability h n (G n (m t−1 )) will depend upon the staying propensity 291 α n of individual I n and the attractiveness of remaining in group G n (m t−1 ). The 292 staying propensity α n measures the likelihood that individual I n will stay where I n would take into account the benefit of remaining in that group. The benefit 297 β i of group member I i to others depends upon its interactive strategy, the second 298 characteristic that makes up the type of an individual. We will assume that there 299 are two interactive strategies, cooperate (C) and defect (D). The benefit function, 300 β i is then defined as follows
where β C and β D are the benefits of being with a cooperator and defector, respec-304 tively. The benefit of group G n (m t−1 ) to individual I n is then defined as follows
Finally, combining the effects of the staying propensity and the group benefit, in 308 the rest of the paper the staying probability is expressed as the following sigmoid
where 0 < S < 1 is the sensitivity shown to group members. So, for example, S → 0
313
implies that I n shows great sensitivity and would move away immediately if remain-314 ing in group G n (m t−1 ) is unattractive, which is the case when β Gn(mt−1)\{n} < 0.
315
An alternative way of representing the S → 0 limit involves the staying probability being defined using the following step function group. This was referred to as the 'walk away' strategy in [1] .
323
In our model we select an exploration time T , which is the number of steps an 324 individual takes moving around the region before returning to its home place. Thus 325 the larger T , the more time cooperators have to find other cooperators, but also 326 the more time there is for them to be found by defectors. 3.2.3. Fitness. We assume that the change in fitness of an individual depends upon 328 direct group interactions and whether a movement has been made.
329
For these group interactions we will consider a public goods game in which the 
340
The direct group interaction payoff functions are then defined as follows
where |G| C is the number of cooperators in group G. Note the cooperators still pay 344 a cost when they are alone.
345
An individual will pay a cost of λ for every movement that it makes. The 346 movement cost is chosen so that it does not exceed the direct group interaction 347 payoff an individual receives (for the same reasons as for the cooperative cost c,
348
and large movement costs could be similarly accommodated if necessary), that is
The fitness contribution is then given by tion function is then defined as follows
366 367 We note that combining equations (24) and (42), we have that w i,j = w j,i and cess). This means that some individuals may find cooperators faster than others.
441
The parameters used in the simulations are summarised in Table 3 .
442
Apart from an individual's interactive strategy and staying propensity, all other 443 parameters are considered to be fixed. Each individual inherits these two charac- The mutations of these characteristics are sufficiently infrequent that the popu-455 lation is assumed to consist of a maximum of two types; resident and mutant, whose 456 competition will result in fixation of one of the types before a new mutant appears.
457
We consider two different scenarios to account for the different mutation rates of 458 each characteristic. propensity. In this scenario, the mutation rate of an individual's interactive strat-463 egy is much slower than the rate of mutations that involve their staying propensity.
464
Since it is much more likely that the staying propensity mutates than the inter- same interactive strategy and are using a (strict) Nash equilibrium staying propen-471 sity (a strict Nash equilibrium propensity is one where the fixation probability is 472 maximised and changing the staying propensity is disadvantageous). Eventually, a 473 mutant with a different interactive strategy and staying propensity will appear, and 474 the quantity of interest at this point is the fixation probability of this mutant type.
475
We assume that the staying propensity of the mutant can be different from the 476 Nash equilibrium staying propensity of the resident population it is invading. The 477 resident population will therefore be stable if it can resist invasion from a mutant 478 using any staying propensity. Rather than considering any arbitrary mutant, the 479 focus will be on the mutant most likely to invade, i.e. one maximising its fixation 480 probability. : c ∈ (0, 1) and b ∈ (0, 1) .
485
In this set we identify all the points (a, 
499
The Nash equilibrium staying propensity of the resident cooperators γ R is cal- propensity a that was picked and this process is repeated several times. After around 506 20 repetitions, the staying propensity that gives the maximum fixation probability 507 remains the same, that is, we can see that is a (strict) Nash equilibrium because 508 it is a best response to itself and any other strategy will be disadvantageous. We 509 therefore set γ R to the value of a we get after 20 repetitions.
510
We hypothesize that there is only one solution to the Nash equilibrium staying 511 propensity. As seen in Figure 1 , the best response staying propensity of one type which would need a discontinuity in Figure 1 , as described above). We should note 526 that we have no proof of the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium staying propensity, 527 although in all cases considered, the solution to the process described in the previous 528 paragraph is independent of the starting position. Figure 1 . This plot shows the best response staying propensities for 1 type C i individual playing against N − 1 type C j individuals. Parameter set 1 is used with λ = 0.2 and i, j ∈ {0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.99}. The intersection point of the plots gives the unique strategy which is a best response to itself, i.e. the unique cooperator resident Nash equilibrium staying propensity γ R , which is somewhere between 0.3 and 0.4. This value is similar to the one obtained using the iterative method (see Figure 2) . The values from the current figure are approximate only because of the jagged nature of the lines; these occur because of the very large number of simulations that would be necessary to obtain a smooth version (the figure uses 10000 simulations for each combination). The figure is used to illustrate the uniqueness of the solution only. For very low movement cost, both mutant types have a significantly lower staying 535 propensity than the resident population that they are invading. They can therefore 536 invade the resident population because they take less time to find cooperators. one explanation for this is that the fitness of the individuals, which is the average 565 reward over the exploration time, will naturally have a higher value the larger the 566 coalition time.
567
In Figure 3 reducing the exploration time T from 10 to 5 steps decreases the 568 coalition time which adversely affects the cooperators. One of the key differences 569 is that the resident cooperators now find it much more difficult to prevent invasion 570 from a mutant defector. The shape of the plot for a mutant cooperator is largely 571 the same but with a consistently lower fixation probability. In Figure 4 increasing in each of these figures, however. We see that the fixation probability is slightly 581 higher for cooperators when compared to this line for the larger population of Figure   582 5 (although it is also more sensitive to the movement cost) than for the smaller 583 population. The key difference is that a mutant defector has fixation probability 584 consistently under the neutral line in Figure 5 and so cannot invade even for very time it takes to find cooperators. In particular, an individual that is currently not 594 in a cooperating group will have to search N − 1 places to find one, therefore, the 595 probability of a defector finding a cooperating group decreases as N gets larger.
596
This means that cooperators would resist invasion by defectors better, as we have 597 noted above. : c ∈ (0, 1) and a ∈ (0, 1) .
629
In the first set we are finding the Nash equilibrium staying propensity a of N/2 type 630 C a playing against N/2 type D b , where b is some arbitrary staying propensity. In 631 the second set we are finding the Nash equilibrium staying propensity b of N/2 type D b playing against N/2 type C a , where a is some arbitrary staying propensity. The 633 point at which these two sets intersect is (γ, δ), that is, both types will be using 634 their Nash equilibrium staying propensities.
635
To calculate γ and δ we use a similar iterative procedure from scenario A. To 636 initialise the iterative procedure we arbitrarily choose some staying propensities a 0 637 and b 0 , and the iterative step is as follows. We calculate the fixation probability b that gives the maximum fixation probability is picked, which is labelled b 1 . Note 644 that using a wider ranges for a and b gives the same result so these ranges were 645 used for efficiency. After around 20 repetitions of the iterative step, the staying 646 propensities a and b that give the maximum fixation probability remain the same,
647
which means that we are at a (strict) Nash equilibrium because any other values 648 would be disadvantageous. We therefore set γ = a 20 and δ = b 20 .
649
We hypothesize that γ and δ are unique. For cooperators, their Nash equilibrium 650 staying propensity is relatively stable because it is predominantly determined by the given that the movement cost is not too large, otherwise it would be max(α). In A. In this case, δ changes with the movement cost in a similar way that γ changes.
664
Therefore, the key difference here is that a mutant cooperator cannot invade for 665 very low movement cost because the resident defectors have a very low staying 666 propensity, which means that they take much less time to find cooperators. Figure 8. This plot shows the best response cooperator staying propensity (solid line, value shown on the x-axis) versus the range of defector staying propensities on the y-axis, and the best response defector staying propensity (dashed line, value shown on the y-axis) versus the range of cooperator staying propensities (on the x-axis) for N/2 cooperators and N/2 defectors. Parameter set 1 is used with λ = 0.2 and the staying propensities are chosen from the set {0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.99}. The best response staying propensities cross at one point only, which is thus the unique Nash equilibrium, where γ ≈ 0.7 and δ ≈ 0.5. These values are similar to those obtained using the iterative method described earlier (see Figure  9 ). As before, the values from the current figure are approximate only because of the jagged nature of the lines; the figure is used to illustrate the uniqueness of the solution only. cannot avoid the defectors. This is shown in Figure 13 where c = 0.04. Increasing 687 the cost c though, makes it even more difficult for the cooperators regardless of v/c.
688
In Figure 14 , a mutant cooperator cannot invade for any v/c. This is because a shown using plots but will be explained in this section. Making the individuals more sensitive to their group members by decreasing the 694 sensitivity parameter S improves the chances of cooperation evolving. In equation
695
(38), we can see that decreasing S will increase the size of the denominator if 696 the group benefit is negative, thereby increasing the probability that an individual 697 moves away from its current position if it is undesirable to stay. Therefore, as S → 0 698 the more sensitive individuals become, which helps the evolution of cooperation 699 because it reduces the exploitation of cooperators (cooperators are now more likely 700 to move away if the group they are in becomes undesirable).
701
Another way in which the group member sensitivity can be changed is by choosing The classical fixed fitness models involve a resident population of fitness 1 and an invading mutant of fitness r. The Moran fixation probability is given as 
752 753
In our results we have used the BDB dynamics, so that in the limiting case of 
758
This leaves the dynamics BDD and DBB. Only a very special subclass of weight 759 matrices, some isothermal and some not, could yield the Moran probability for these 760 two dynamics (different for each dynamics). Thus in general these dynamics will 761 not yield the Moran probability in the fixed fitness case, although for the structure 762 used in this paper this is actually a reasonable approximation.
763
Thus it is clear that, for the weights described in Section 3.2.4, our framework 764 affects evolution primarily through how it affects the fitnesses through the interac- of dynamics being used less important.
836
We note that our work effectively involves a coevolution of population strategy 837 and structure, and that there has been significant research on this over the past ten 838 years or so, as in for example [42, 43] . In such models the growth and structure 
853
Furthermore through our framework, we can see a clear connection between mod-854 els with mobile individuals as in the current paper, and those on a fixed structure.
855
We see an interesting alternative (but which has a similar effect) 
